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A NOTE ON ITERATED CONSISTENCY
AND INFINITE PROOFS
ANTON FREUND
Abstract. Schmerl and Beklemishev’s work on iterated reflection achieves
two aims: It introduces the important notion of Π0
1
-ordinal, characterizing
the Π0
1
-theorems of a theory in terms of transfinite iterations of consistency;
and it provides an innovative calculus to compute the Π0
1
-ordinals for a range
of theories. The present note demonstrates that these achievements are in-
dependent: We read off Π0
1
-ordinals from a Schu¨tte-style ordinal analysis via
infinite proofs, in a direct and transparent way.
The central result of Schmerl’s [Sch79] work on iterated reflection is the fine
structure theorem: Over primitive recursive arithmetic (PRA), α iterations of
(uniform) Πn+1-reflection prove the same Πn-theorems as ω
α iterations of Πn-
reflection, for n ≥ 1 and α > 0 (we will only be concerned with arithmetical
formulas, so we usually write Πn rather than Π
0
n). Together with Kreisel and
Le´vy’s result [KL68], which states that Peano arithmetic (PA) is equivalent to the
collection of arithmetical reflection principles over PRA, this yields
PA ≡Π1 PRA+ {Conα(PRA) |α < ε0}.
Here ≡Π1 indicates that the two theories prove the same Π1-formulas. Furthermore,
Conα(PRA) is a Π1-formula which expresses transfinite iterations of consistency
over PRA. It will be convenient to consider iterations which are slightly stronger
than Schmerl and Beklemishev’s version at limit stages; a precise definition can be
found below. Beklemishev [Bek03] extends Schmerl’s results (in particular weak-
ening PRA to Kalma´r elementary arithmetic) and coins the notion of Π01-ordinal:
This bounds the number of iterations of consistency that are provable in a given
theory. In most natural cases these iterated consistency statements exhaust all Π1-
consequences of that theory, as in the example above. The Π01-ordinal is particularly
significant for theories with strong Π1-axioms, which are not captured by other no-
tions of proof-theoretic ordinal. For example, Beklemishev [Bek03, Corollary 7.11]
shows that PA+Con(PA) has the Π01-ordinal ε0 · 2.
Besides being fascinating in itself, the fine structure theorem is useful to analyse
a range of theories. It is particularly pertinent for theories such as PA+Con(PA),
which are naturally phrased in terms of reflection (or consistency). However, when
it comes to stronger theories (e.g. of second order arithmetic) infinite proofs a` la
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Schu¨tte are currently much more powerful. Also, infinite proofs can be useful to
analyse restrictions on the cut rank or the proof length. It is thus important to ask
whether one can infer Π01-ordinals from a Schu¨tte-style ordinal analysis. Indeed,
there are indirect ways to achieve this: An ordinal analysis via infinite proofs
characterizes a theory in terms of transfinite induction. We can then invoke the
connection between transfinite induction and iterated consistency established by
Schmerl [Sch79, Section 2]. Let us point out that this connection is not entirely
trivial — in particular Schmerl’s proof uses the fine structure theorem, and it
only works for ordinals of the form ωω
α
. Alternatively, we can use a Schu¨tte-style
ordinal analysis to determine the provably total functions of a theory — although
this is again a non-trivial task, particularly for large ordinals, where fundamental
sequences can be delicate. Beklemishev [Bek03, Section 3] connects the provably
total functions to iterations of Π2-reflection, and another application of the fine
structure theorem yields the Π01-ordinal. While these general connections exist, it
would be desirable to directly read off Π01-ordinals from infinite proofs. The present
note demonstrates that this is very much possible: Assume that the Π1-formula ϕ
has a cut-free ω-proof of height α, provably in PRA. We will see that this implies
PRA+ ∀γ<αConγ(PRA) ⊢ ϕ.
As a corollary we obtain the above characterization of the Π1-consequences of Peano
arithmetic. To minimize technical difficulty we will focus on infinite proofs that
arise from an embedding of Peano arithmetic. Nevertheless, it will be clear that the
same arguments apply to other proofs in ω-logic, once they are suitably formalized
inPRA. Also, we focus on iterations of consistency (i.e. Π1-reflection), which seems
to be the most important case. It would be easy to adapt the same arguments to
iterations of Πn-reflection, in order to read off bounds on Beklemishev’s Π
0
n-ordinals
(see [Bek03]).
Iterated Consistency
On an intuitive level, we define iterations of consistency over primitive recursive
arithmetic by the recursion
Tα = PRA+ ∀γ<αCon(Tγ).
We point out that this deviates from the definition used by Beklemishev, who takes
T′α = PRA+ {Con(T
′
γ) | γ < α}.
The difference is just an index shift at limit stages: As T′α+1 entails Con(T
′
α) it
proves that all Π1-consequences of T
′
α are true, which gives T
′
α+1 ⊢ ∀γ<αCon(T
′
γ).
The stronger limit step will make for more appealing bounds in our context. More
formally, the definition of the theories Tα depends on an arithmetization of the
relevant ordinals. In this note we work with the usual notation system for ε0.
Following [Bek03, Section 2], it will be most convenient to formalize the relation
“ϕ is provable in Tα”: Using an arithmetization PrPRA(·) of provability in PRA
the fixed point lemma yields a formula α(ϕ) with
(1) PRA ⊢ α(ϕ)↔ PrPRA(∀γ<α˙¬γ(0 = 1)→ ϕ).
This very equivalence shows that α(ϕ) is Σ1 in PRA. Thus
Conα(PRA) :≡ ¬α(0 = 1)
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is a Π1-formula. Negating both sides of (1) we see
PRA ⊢ Conα(PRA)↔ Con(PRA+ ∀γ<α˙Conγ(PRA)).
This suggests that
Tα := PRA+ ∀γ<αConγ(PRA)
captures the above intuition. Further justification comes from the result that
equivalences such as (1) determine the relation α(ϕ) completely (see [Bek03,
Lemma 2.3]). It may be astonishing that this holds over PRA, where we have
limited access to transfinite induction. Instead, the result relies on a principle of
“reflexive induction”, due to Schmerl and Girard (see [Sch79]). Beklemishev states
a slightly strengthened version, which will be important later:
Lemma 1. For any formula ϕ(α) in the language of PRA, if we have
PRA ⊢ ∀α(PrPRA(∀γ<α˙ϕ(γ))→ ϕ(α))
— we say that ϕ is reflexively progressive — then we can conclude
PRA ⊢ ∀αϕ(α).
Proof. We cite the short argument from [Bek03, Lemma 2.4]: To conclude by Lo¨b’s
theorem it suffices to establish
PRA ⊢ PrPRA(∀αϕ(α))→ ∀αϕ(α).
Working in PRA, assume PrPRA(∀αϕ(α)). In particular PrPRA(∀γ<α˙ϕ(γ)) holds
for any α. By assumption this implies ϕ(α). Since α was arbitrary we have ∀αϕ(α),
as required. 
We will also need the following easy observation:
Lemma 2. If the formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is Π1 in PRA then we have
PRA ⊢ ∀α(Conα(PRA) ∧α(ϕ(x˙1, . . . , x˙n))→ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)).
Proof. Arguing in PRA, consider an arbitrary ordinal α. To establish the con-
trapositive of the claim, assume that we have ¬ϕ(x1, . . . , xn). By Σ1-completeness
we get PrPRA(ϕ(x˙1, . . . , x˙n) → 0 = 1). Also assume α(ϕ(x˙1, . . . , x˙n)), and ob-
serve that this means PrPRA(∀γ<α˙¬γ(0 = 1) → ϕ(x˙1, . . . , x˙n)). Combining the
two implications we obtain PrPRA(∀γ<α˙¬γ(0 = 1) → 0 = 1). This amounts
to α(0 = 1), which is equivalent to ¬Conα(PRA), completing the proof of the
contrapositive. 
Bounds from Infinite Proofs
Let us briefly review the ordinal analysis of Peano arithmetic via infinite proofs,
and its formalization in PRA. We will follow the approach of Buchholz [Buc91],
where the reader can find all missing details. The infinitary proof system is based
on (Tait-style) sequent calculus: Rather than single formulas one derives finite
sets (“sequents”), which are to be read disjunctively. Thus, the sequent Γ ≡
{ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} is interpreted as the disjunction
∨
Γ ≡ ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn. As usual we
write Γ, ϕ rather than Γ∪ {ϕ}. The characteristic feature of our infinite calculus is
the ω-rule
Γ, ϕ(0) Γ, ϕ(1) · · · ,
Γ, ∀nϕ(n)
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with a premise for each numeral. In other words, if we know that the disjunction∨
Γ ∨ ϕ(n) holds for each number n then we can infer
∨
Γ ∨ ∀nϕ(n). Similarly,
there are rules to introduce propositional connectives and existential quantifiers, in
these cases with finitely many premises. As axioms we take true prime formulas.
To derive a formula we combine these rules into a proof tree. In the presence of
the infinitary ω-rule these trees will generally have infinite height. The reader may
observe that any true arithmetical formula can be derived with finite height — but
this is not much use if we work in PRA or another weak theory, which recognizes
few formulas as true. What PRA does know (see below) is that proofs in Peano
arithmetic can be translated into infinite proofs. The resulting proof trees have
height below ω · 2. At the same time, this embedding introduces cut rules
Γ, ϕ Γ,¬ϕ .
Γ
Note that the cut formula ϕ may be very complex, even if we know that the end-
sequent Γ is very simple. This can be problematic when we check properties by
induction over proofs. The famous method of cut elimination removes that obstacle:
It allows us to reduce the complexity of cut formulas, increasing the height of the
proof by a power of ω in each step. In the end we obtain a cut-free proof with
height below ε0. From this proof we can read off the desired bounds. There are
several ways to formalize infinite proofs in PRA. One option would be to work
with primitive recursive proof trees, represented by numerical codes. We choose
the particularly elegant approach of Buchholz [Buc91]: The idea is to name proofs
by the role they play in the cut elimination process. For each (finite) proof d in
Peano arithmetic one introduces a constant symbol [d], which names the embedding
of d into the infinite system. Furthermore, one adds a unary function symbol E:
If h is a name for an infinite proof tree then the term Eh names the result of cut
elimination (with cut rank reduced by one). Auxiliary function symbols Ik,ϕ and
Rψ refer to inversion and reduction, the usual ingredients of cut elimination. The
resulting set of terms is denoted by Z∗. Crucially, there is a primitive recursive
function s : N × Z∗ → Z∗ which computes codes for the immediate subtrees of a
proof tree. For example, if the last rule of h (also read off by a primitive recursive
function) is not a cut then we have sn(Eh) = Esn(h). Intuitively this means that
we apply cut elimination to the n-th subtree of h in order to get the n-th subtree
of Eh. Officially, the equation sn(Eh) = Esn(h) is part of the definition of s, which
goes by recursion over the terms in Z∗. Similarly, we have functions to read off
the end sequent, the cut rank, and the ordinal height of (the proof represented
by) a given term. We should mention that it is crucial to extend the infinitary
system by a “repetition rule”, which simply repeats its premise: It permits us to
“call” a proof even if we cannot immediately determine its last rule. The point is
that Buchholz’ approach allows a very smooth formalization in PRA: We simply
work with a system of terms, without official reference to their interpretation as
infinite trees. In PRA we can show that the proof terms are “locally correct”.
Amongst other things, this means that the ordinal height of sn(h) is smaller than
the ordinal height of h. Having explained this approach we can revert to more
traditional notation: By h ⊢α0 Γ we express that h ∈ Z
∗ codes a cut-free proof of (a
sub-sequent of) Γ with ordinal height α. We write ⊢α0 Γ to indicate that this holds
for some term h ∈ Z∗.
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When we try to track usual (i.e. finite) provability through an infinite proof,
the ω-rule poses an obstruction: From PRA ⊢ ϕ(n) for all n ∈ N we cannot
infer PRA ⊢ ∀nϕ(n). On the other hand, PRA ⊢ ∀n PrPRA(ϕ(n˙)) does imply
PRA+Con(PRA) ⊢ ∀nϕ(n), provided that ϕ is a Π1-formula. This explains why
iterated consistency is needed. Iterations of consistency are important for a second
reason as well: They will make it possible to use the reflexive induction principle.
These ideas lead to the main result of the present note:
Theorem 3. Provably in PRA, we have
⊢α0 Γ ⇒ α(
∨
Γ)
for any sequent Γ that consists of Π1-formulas only.
Proof. We argue by reflexive induction on α, as established in Lemma 1. Working
in PRA, we may thus assume
PrPRA(∀γ<α˙∀h∈Z∗(h ⊢
γ
0 Γ ∧ “Γ consists of Π1-formulas”→ γ(
∨
Γ)))
in order to deduce the claim for α. The antecendent of that claim provides h ⊢α0 Γ
for some h ∈ Z∗, where Γ is a sequent of Π1-formulas. We must deduce α(
∨
Γ).
Let us assume that h ends in an ω-rule that introduces the formula ∀nϕ(n) ∈ Γ
— in all other cases the argument is similar and easier. By Σ1-completeness we can
recover the assumptions inside PRA, i.e. we get
PrPRA(h˙ ⊢
α˙
0 Γ˙ ∧ “h˙ ends in an ω-rule that introduces ∀nϕ(n)”).
Recall that sn(h) ∈ Z
∗ denotes the n-th immediate subtree of the infinite proof de-
noted by h. By the local correctness of Z∗, this subtree deduces the premise Γ, ϕ(n)
of the ω-rule, with ordinal height αn < α. Applying this argument in the meta the-
ory PRA would only give the subtrees sn(h) for “standard” numbers n. This is
not enough for our purpose, but the same argument in the object theory does yield
PrPRA(∀n∃αn<α˙ sn(h˙) ⊢
αn
0 Γ˙, ϕ˙(n)).
Note that ϕ(n) is a Π1-formula (indeed a ∆0-formula), since ∀nϕ(n) occurs in Γ.
Thus the reflexive induction hypothesis implies
PrPRA(∀n∃αn<α˙αn(
∨
Γ ∨ ϕ(n˙))).
Formalizing Lemma 2 in PRA we get
PrPRA(∀γ<α˙Conγ(PRA)→ ∀n(
∨
Γ ∨ ϕ(n))).
In view of ∀nϕ(n) ∈ Γ one obtains
PrPRA(∀γ<α˙Conγ(PRA)→
∨
Γ).
By equivalence (1) this amounts to α(
∨
Γ), as required. 
The result cited in the introduction is an easy consequence:
Corollary 4 (Schmerl). We have
PA ≡Π1 PRA+ {Conα(PRA) |α < ε0}.
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Proof. First, assume that ϕ is a Π1-theorem of Peano arithmetic. By embedding
and cut elimination (see [Buc91]) we get ⊢α0 ϕ for some ordinal α < ε0, provably
in PRA. In this situation, the previous theorem yields PRA ⊢ α(ϕ). Using
Lemma 2 we can infer PRA+ Conα(PRA) ⊢ ϕ, as required. In fact, equival-
ence (1) and the soundness of PRA give the sharper bound
PRA+ ∀γ<αConγ(PRA) ⊢ ϕ,
as promised in the introduction. Conversely, Peano arithmetic proves Conα(PA) by
transfinite induction up to any fixed α < ε0: Assume ∀β<γ Conβ(PRA) by induc-
tion hypothesis. The contrapositive of Σ1-reflection over PRA, which is provable
in PA, yields Con(PRA+ ∀β<γ˙ Conβ(PRA)), or equivalently Conγ(PRA). 
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